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Abstract
I examine ramifications of the widespread view that scientific objectivity gives us
a permission to trust scientific knowledge claims. According to a widely accepted
account of trust and trustworthiness, trust in scientific knowledge claims involves both
reliance on the claims and trust in scientistswhopresent the claims, and trustworthiness
depends on expertise, honesty, and social responsibility. Given this account, scientific
objectivity turns out to be a hybrid conceptwith both an epistemic and amoral-political
dimension. The epistemic dimension tells us when scientific knowledge claims are
reliable, and the moral-political dimension tells us when we can trust scientists to
be socially responsible. While the former dimension has received a fair amount of
attention, the latter is in need of analysis. I examine what it means for scientists to
be socially responsible, that is, to follow “sound” moral and social values in different
stages of scientific inquiry (Kourany in Philosophy of science after feminism, Oxford
University Press, New York, 2010). Social responsibility is especially important when
scientists function as experts in society. Members of the public and policymakers do
not want to rely on scientific research shaped by moral and social values they have
good reasons to reject.Moreover, social responsibility is important in social research in
which moral and social values can legitimately play many roles. I discuss the strengths
andweaknesses of different answers to the questionof howsocial scientists can identify
appropriate moral and social values to inform their research. I argue that procedural
accounts of social responsibility, such aswell-ordered science and deliberative polling,
have limitations.
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1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed a renewed interest in the concept of scientific objectivity
(Alexandrova 2018; Eigi 2017; Koskinen 2017, 2018; Kusch 2017; Ludwig 2017;
Padovani et al. 2015). According to a widespread view, scientific objectivity is the
kind of feature that gives us a permission to trust scientific knowledge claims. As
Heather Douglas explains, when we say that a scientific knowledge claim is objective,
we endorse the claim, stating that the claim can be trusted by ourselves and by others
(2009, p. 117; see also Grasswick 2010; Scheman 2001).
I examine ramifications of the view that scientific objectivity can ground trust in
scientific knowledge claims. When we trust a knowledge claim that p, we rely on p,
for instance, by taking p as a premise in our reasoning or by acting on the assumption
that p is likely to be true. As Koskinen (2018) argues, scientific objectivity involves a
specific kind of reliance.Whenwe claim that something is objective, we suggest that it
is reliable in the sense that epistemic risks arising from the imperfections of epistemic
agents have been averted effectively. For example, biases due to sexist and racist
ideologies are epistemic risks arising from the imperfections of epistemic agents.Many
accounts of scientific objectivity identify epistemic risks of this type and strategies
for eliminating such risks. One such account is Helen Longino’s critical contextual
empiricism, which recommends a collective strategy for managing epistemic risks.
According to Longino, scientific knowledge claims are objective to the degree that
a relevant scientific community satisfies the four criteria of “public venues,” “uptake
of criticism,” “public standards,” and “tempered equality of intellectual authority”
(2002, pp. 129–131; see also 1990, pp. 76–81). The four criteria, she argues, increase
objectivity because together they facilitate “transformative criticism” (1990, p. 76),
which is instrumental in eliminating errors.
While I do not object to this analysis of objectivity, I argue that there is more
to objectivity than this. If trust in scientific knowledge claims involves not merely
reliance on the claims but also trust in scientists who present the claims (Douglas
2009; Grasswick 2010; Longino 1990; Scheman 2001), then we need to take a closer
look at the notions of epistemic trust and trustworthiness. Trust is epistemic when it
provides a reason to believe or accept a view, and epistemic trust is rational when it
is based on evidence of the trustworthiness of the person whom we trust. In a relation
of epistemic trust, a person A trusts another person B to have good reasons to believe
that p, and A’s trust in B is a reason for A to believe that p (Hardwig 1991, p. 697). As
Wilholt explains, “To invest epistemic trust in someone is to trust her in her capacity
as provider of information” (2013, p. 233). Moreover, trusting is the kind of relying
that makes us vulnerable and dependent on the goodwill of the trusted person towards
us (Baier 1986, p. 251). This means that “The trusting can be betrayed, or at least let
down, and not just disappointed” (1986, p. 235). As Annette Baier explains, trusting
involves relying on the trusted person’s “discretionary powers” in deciding what needs
to be done (1986, p. 237). For example, when a person A places her epistemic trust
in B, A relies on B to use her judgment to decide what it takes to provide reliable,
relevant, and significant information (see also Grasswick 2010).
The notion of epistemic trust is relevant when a person finds herself in a relation of
epistemic dependence. Such a relation can hold between scientists and non-scientists
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but also between scientists. The latter case occurs, for example, in scientific collab-
orations when a scientist depends on other members of her team to produce crucial
pieces for their joint research paper (Wagenknecht 2015). The former case takes place,
for example, when a member of the public depends on scientists to provide her with
knowledge that is vital for her to know. In general, a person A is epistemically depen-
dent on another person B when B possesses knowledge that A is dependent on and
it is more rational for A to rely on B than to rely on herself, or to spend a significant
amount of time and effort to acquire and to understand the evidence B has (Hardwig
1985). Unless A wishes to stay ignorant, she can try to manage the relation of epis-
temic dependence by considering whether epistemic trust in B is a rational way of
grounding her belief. However, if A has access to the evidence that B possesses and
the expertise necessary for analyzing the evidence on her own, she does not need to
trust B. Epistemic trust is redundant when A can do the epistemic assessment on her
own without depending on B.
When we find ourselves in a relation of epistemic dependence, trust in scientific
knowledge claims involves not merely reliance on the claims but also trust in scien-
tists who present the claims. While philosophers have considered various accounts of
trustworthiness (Simon forthcoming), hardly anyone denies that scientists’ trustwor-
thiness depends on their expertise, honesty and social responsibility (Anderson 2011;
Goldman 2001; Hardwig 1991; Kourany 2010). The requirement of expertise means
that when we trust scientists as providers of information, we believe them to possess
a relatively high level of knowledge in a particular domain, an ability to deploy this
knowledge in answering questions, and an ability to generate new knowledge (Gold-
man 2001, p. 91). The requirement of honesty means that we believe them to be honest
in communicating their views to us (Anderson 2011; Hardwig 1991). While there is
disagreement over what the requirement of social responsibility means, in Sect. 2
I will defend the view that social responsibility requires scientists to follow “sound”
moral and social values in different stages of scientific inquiry (Kourany 2010, p. 106).
The trusted person needs to meet the requirement of honesty and social responsibil-
ity to demonstrate goodwill towards those who are epistemically dependent on her
(Grasswick 2010, p. 406).
Especially those philosophers, who are critical of the value-free ideal of science,
have embraced the view that social responsibility requires scientists to follow “sound”
moral and social values (Kourany 2010, p. 106; see also Alexandrova 2018; Brown
2013; Intemann 2015; Rolin 2012). They believe that epistemic trust in scientists
involves trust in their capacity to make sound moral and social value judgments in
research (Wilholt 2013, p. 248; see also Brown 2013; Frost-Arnold 2013; Hardwig
1991; Kourany 2010; Rolin 2016a). The critics of the value-free ideal argue that moral
and social value judgments are unavoidable when scientists use morally or socially
value-laden concepts (Alexandrova 2018), or when they make judgments concerning
morally and socially acceptable inductive risk (Douglas 2009). Insofar as scientific
knowledge is not free from moral and social values, to trust a scientific knowledge
claim is in part to trust that it is based on appropriate moral and social value judgments
(Alexandrova 2018, p. 436). Trust in scientists’ capacity tomake such value judgments
is especially important when scientists function as experts in society. Members of the
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public and policymakers do not want to rely on scientific research shaped by moral
and social values they have good reasons to reject.
It is not my aim to pursue further the question of how trustworthiness is to be
understood.The above analysis suffices for identifying an aspect of trustworthiness that
is understudied, social responsibility. Insofar as objectivity plays a role in legitimizing
epistemic trust, we have a reason to believe that an account of objectivity should
involve also an account of socially responsible science.
In line with the special issue topic “Objectivity in Social Research,” I examine what
socially responsible science amounts to especially in social research. The challenge is
to understand what it means for social scientists to follow appropriate moral and social
values in different stages of scientific inquiry. The underlying assumption is that social
scientists have a reasonable degree of autonomy to make decisions concerning, for
example, what they study and how they study it. By a reasonable degree of autonomy, I
mean autonomy that is constrained by the requirements of research ethics and available
research funding (see also Hicks 2011). Within these constraints, it is up to social
scientists to decide which moral and social values guide their research. In order to
earn and maintain trustworthiness, social scientists should make these decisions in a
socially responsible way. Autonomy and social responsibility do not cancel each other
out. Quite the contrary, autonomy is a precondition for social responsibility. Social
responsibility helps social scientists protect autonomy.
At least two questions wait for further exploration. One question is what roles moral
and social values can legitimately play in different stages of scientific inquiry. I call
this the Proper Roles Question. Another question is how social scientists can identify
appropriate moral and social values, the values that should play the proper roles in
scientific inquiry. I call this the Proper Values Question. The Proper Values Question
is raised within the framework of liberal pluralism, assuming that there is room for
reasonable disagreement over moral and social values as long as the values do not
jeopardize liberal democracy (see also Van Bouwel 2009).
In response to the Proper Values Question, I argue that procedural accounts of
social responsibility cannot guarantee that scientists receive adequate information
about appropriate moral and social values. Philosophers’ attempts to define and defend
an ideal procedure of pooling information about citizens’ value perspectives miss an
important aspect of well-functioning liberal democratic societies: the on-going strug-
gle to make visible the social experiences of subordinate or marginal social groups.
Social experiences play an important role in deliberative democracy because they
are sources of moral and social value judgments that can enter into the process of
deliberation about policy issues (Bohman 2006). Purely procedural accounts of social
responsibility will be incomplete as long as the available pool of social experiences
and value perspectives is incomplete.
I start my inquiry into socially responsible science by reviewing different answers to
theProper RolesQuestion in Sect. 2. The review is necessary in order to understand the
challenges we face when we address the Proper Values Question. In Sect. 3, I discuss
three different approaches to the Proper Values Question, an expert-driven, a market-
driven, and a government-driven approach. I explain why they are unsatisfactory. In
Sect. 4, I discuss two procedural accounts of social responsibility, well-ordered science
(Kitcher 2001, 2011) and deliberative polling (Alexandrova 2018; Fishkin 2009). I
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show that the two accounts have limitations and need to be supplemented with other
strategies. In Sect. 5, I propose one strategy to increase the social responsibility of
scientific research. I argue that scientific/intellectual movements have an important
role to play in this strategy.
2 The proper roles question
In response to the Proper Roles Question, many philosophers would argue that moral
and social values justify the imposition of constraints on scientific inquiry by ordering
scientists not to harm human subjects. Scientists have an obligation to protect the
privacyof human subjects, and the latter should be free to decidewhether they give their
informed consent to any specific research project. Moreover, moral and social values
play an irreducible role in decisions concerning what topics are worthy of research
and for what practical purposes scientific knowledge is sought. For example, Philip
Kitcher (1993) argues that moral and social values play a role in decisions concerning
significance in scientific research. According to Kitcher, the goal of scientific inquiry
is significant truth rather than plain truth, and consequently, the goals of scientific
inquiry are as many as there are views about significance in science (1993, p. 94). In
his view, significance reflects the non-epistemic concerns of the age even when such
concerns appear to be internal of science (Kitcher 2001, p. 82).
In this section, I argue that besides playing a role in agenda-setting, moral and social
values can enter into the core of scientific inquiry, thereby undermining the ideal of
value-free science. The value-free ideal is the view that moral and social values should
not play any roles in the core of scientific inquiry, in which scientific knowledge claims
are epistemically justified or criticized, and ultimately, either accepted or rejected. I
review four arguments against the value-free ideal: an argument from inductive risk,
an argument from pluralism (with respect to epistemic values), an argument from
normative background assumptions, and an argument from qualitative data collection.
Each argument helps understand how moral and social value judgments can be part of
social research andwhy such value judgments should bemade in a socially responsible
way. Most importantly, the arguments show that socially responsible science should
not be equated with value-free science.
2.1 Argument from inductive risk
According to the inductive risk argument, the value-free ideal is not feasible because
moral and social values have a legitimate role to play in the evaluation of risks involved
in accepting scientific knowledge claims (Douglas 2009). Since accepting knowledge
claims involves uncertainty, scientists have to decide when the evidence at hand is
sufficiently strong to warrant acceptance. This decision depends on the consequences
of accepting knowledge claims. If a scientist accepts a false hypothesis, there may be
a cost associated with this type of error. If she rejects a true hypothesis, there may
be another cost associated with the other type of error. The assessment of the costs
involved in these two mistakes is a matter of moral value judgment.
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According to Douglas (2009), the problem with the value-free ideal is that the ideal
encourages scientists to ignore their moral responsibility. Like most human beings,
scientists are morally responsible for their actions and the foreseeable consequences
of their actions (2009, p. 67). This means that we can praise or blame scientists for
their actions. Blame is an appropriate attitude when scientists are morally responsible
for harms caused by their making overly strong knowledge claims and downplaying
the risk of error (2009, p. 87). When scientists do not make moral value judgments
concerning acceptable risk, they can be blamed for being reckless or negligent (2009,
p. 81).
In response to the Proper Roles Question, Douglas introduces a distinction between
a direct and indirect role. Values play a direct role when they act as reasons in them-
selves to accept a knowledge claim and an indirect role when they act as reasons
to accept a certain level of uncertainty (2009, p. 96). While moral and social values
should not play a direct role, they can legitimately play an indirect one. A direct role
is not acceptable because it means that non-epistemic values would play the same
role as evidence does. As Douglas explains, “values are not evidence, and should not
take the place of evidence in our reasoning” (2009, p. 156). An indirect role is accept-
able because scientists are morally responsible for their knowledge claims and the
predictable consequences of making such claims (2009, p. 106). While some philoso-
phers argue that the distinction between direct and indirect roles for values in science
stands in need of further clarification (Elliott 2011), Douglas’s arguments are often
taken to show that moral and social values should play a role in decisions concerning
when evidence is sufficient.
In sum, the inductive risk argument gives rise to the question of which moral and
social values should guide the evaluation of risks involved in error. As deMelo-Martín
and Intemann (2016) argue, it does not follow from the inductive risk argument that
scientists should evaluate risks on their own. Nor does it follow that scientists should
evaluate risks on the basis of their own moral and social values (see also Elliott 2017).
Scientists, like other human beings, can cause harmwithout intending to do so because
they do not understand what others perceive as harmful. This is why it is an open
question in what Kusch (2007) calls “political philosophy of risk” to decide which
groups should participate in the assessment of potential harms and which moral and
social values should guide judgments about acceptable level of uncertainty.
2.2 Argument from pluralism
The argument from pluralism is concerned with the pluralism of epistemic values
rather than with the pluralism of moral and social values. The argument tells that
the value-free ideal is not attainable because moral and social values can legitimately
play a role in determining which epistemic values scientists emphasize when they
evaluate theories (Longino 1995, 2002). By definition, an epistemic value promotes
the attainment of truth, either intrinsically or extrinsically (Steel 2010). As Daniel
Steel explains, an epistemic value is intrinsic when manifesting that value constitutes
an attainment of or is necessary for truth, and it is extrinsic when it promotes the
attainment of truth without itself being an indicator or a requirement of truth (2010,
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p. 18). Given this definition, epistemic values are a diverse set of criteria and desider-
ata, including theoretical virtues such as empirical adequacy, internal and external
consistency, and explanatory power. It follows that there may be trade-offs between
epistemic values (e.g., between empirical adequacy and simplicity), such that scientists
cannot maximize two values at the same time. The argument from pluralism claims
that scientists are allowed to appeal to moral and social values when they decide how
to weigh different epistemic values. Thus, the argument gives rise to the question of
which moral and social values should guide scientists’ decision to emphasize some
epistemic values at the expense of others.
2.3 Argument from normative background assumptions
According to the argument from normative background assumptions, the value-free
ideal is not feasible because moral and social values can legitimately influence the
choice of background assumptions, which play a role in scientists’ decisions to accept
knowledge claims (Longino 1990, 2002). As Longino explains, the acceptance of sci-
entific knowledge claims takes place in a context of background assumptions, which
are needed to establish the relevance of empirical evidence to a hypothesis or a the-
ory (1990, pp. 43–44; see also 2002, p. 127). While background assumptions may
not always “encode” moral and social values, they sometimes do so (1990, p. 216).
Normative background assumptions figure especially in research on value-laden phe-
nomena, such as human behavior. In response to the Proper Roles Question, Longino
argues that moral and social values can have an impact on background assumptions
“without violating constitutive rules of science” (1990, p. 83).
What Alexandrova calls “mixed claims” also presuppose normative background
assumptions as such claims “mix the normative and the empirical in away that ordinary
scientific claims do not” (2018, p. 422). For example, causal hypotheses about factors
that either increase or decrease human well-being are typically mixed claims because
they presuppose a normative conception of human well-being. In Alexandrova’s view,
we need an account of objectivity that “ensures that values have undergone an appropri-
ate social control, giving a community reasons to trust this knowledge” (2018, p. 436).
She emphasizes that, “Such a controlmay notwarrant blanket trust in a research project
overall, but it would at least warrant trust in the project’s value presuppositions, at least
by the community that exercised control over these values” (2018, p. 436).
The argument from normative background assumptions gives rise to the question of
which moral and social values should guide choices between alternative background
assumptions.
2.4 Argument from qualitative data collection
According to the argument from qualitative data collection, the value-free ideal is not
feasible becausemoral and social values play legitimate roles in participant observation
and semi- and unstructured interviews (Zahle 2018). In qualitative social scientific
research, research questions are open to revisions during the process of data collection.
This is in part because researchers want to have input from the participants of research,
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that is, human subjects they interview, observe or interact with in some other way. Julie
Zahle (2018) argues that because of the open and interactive nature of qualitative data
collection, moral and social values can play a role in decisions about how, if at all,
to change research questions as well as in decisions about what data to collect. For
this reason, the value-free ideal should not be applied to qualitative data collection in
the social sciences. In her view, qualitative data collection should be guided by other
ideals, such as relevance and balance (Zahle 2018, p. 149).
In this section, we have seen four ways in which moral and social values can legit-
imately enter into the core of scientific inquiry. They can guide choices concerning
inductive risk, epistemic values, normative background assumptions, research ques-
tions and what data to collect. This is not, of course, to suggest that moral and social
values cannot have harmful effects on scientific inquiry. They are harmful, for exam-
ple, when they lead to dogmatism. As Elizabeth Anderson explains, we need to ensure
that “value judgments do not operate to drive inquiry to a predetermined conclusion”
(2004, p. 11).
The four arguments against the value-free ideal also suggest that we give up the
conception of social responsibility that goes together with the value-free ideal. As
Kourany argues, the value-free ideal is not an apolitical ideal of science. It is informed
by a certain viewof the proper relation between science and society, namely that society
is best served by value-free scientific knowledge (2010, p. 57). The proponents of the
value-free ideal assume that science and democracy are reconciled when scientists
refrain frommaking anymoral or social value judgments in their research and leave the
task of making such judgments to citizens or democratically elected representatives
(Betz 2013). Given this view of the proper relation between science and society,
socially responsible science amounts to value-free science. However, Kourany (2010),
likemany other philosophers, reject this view on grounds that the value-free ideal is not
attainable. She proposes an alternative conception of social responsibility. According
to this conception, scientific research is socially responsible when scientists follow
“sound” moral and social values in different stages of scientific inquiry (Kourany
2010, p. 106).
In the remaining sections, I seek answers to the question of how scientists are to
receive information about “sound” moral and social values before they undertake a
research project. That moral and social values can play legitimate roles in various
stages of scientific research, does not necessarily undermine democratic principles.
To reconcile science with democracy, we need to understand how scientists’ value
judgments can be integrated with democratic principles. How do we ensure that sci-
entists do not impose their personal value judgments on citizens? How do we ensure
that scientists are not forced to respond to value perspectives they have good reasons
to reject?
3 The proper values question
The Proper Values Question is the question of how scientists can identify the moral
and social values that should guide their value judgments when they are engaged
in scientific research. In this section, I discuss three approaches to this question, an
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expert-driven, a market-driven, and a government-driven approach. Each of the three
approaches is an ideal type, which can be realized to some degree and mixed with
other types.
3.1 Expert-driven approach
According to an expert-driven approach, scientists do not need to consult citizens
or democratically elected representatives to acquire information about appropriate
moral and social values for science. For example, Michael Polanyi, who thought that a
democratic control of science could only be harmful to science (Jarvie 2001, p. 552),
advocated this approach. Putting Polanyi’s argument aside, a contemporary version of
expert-driven approach could be based on the assumption that there are universalmoral
and social values and scientists can have knowledge of them. Insofar as scientists con-
form to universal moral and social values in different stages of scientific inquiry, their
research is socially responsible, and there is no need to negotiate with other parties.
Given this approach, social responsibility does not require scientists to be responsive
to citizens’ value perspectives, some of which may divert from the “right” universal
moral and social values. For example, one candidate for universal moral and social
values is the list of central human capabilities. The list includes ten values: life; bodily
health; bodily integrity; sense, imagination, and thought; emotions; practical reason-
ing; affiliation; other species; play; and control over one’s environment (Nussbaum
2000, pp. 78–80).
It is not my intention to discuss the possibility of universal moral and social values
here. My argument is rather that even if there are universal moral and social values
and scientists can have knowledge of them, such values will not eliminate the need
for scientists to consult citizens or their democratically elected representatives. The
reason for this is that universal moral and social values make room for a diversity
of conceptions of good life, and in any particular research project, scientists face the
problem of choosing between alternative conceptions. For example, the list of human
capabilities excludes only those alternatives that do not involve respect for human
rights or concern for environment and other species. It can accommodate a pluralism
of moral and social value perspectives within these constraints. Pluralism of value
perspectives follows partly from the value of liberty, which urges us to respect different
individual choices, and partly from the value of national sovereignty, which urges us
to respect different political choices aiming to realize the central human capabilities. I
maintain that scientists do not have any special expertise or authority to select values
from the pool of acceptable value perspectives, and therefore, they should consult
citizens. Even if a scientific community were diverse in terms of scientists’ gender,
race, class background, and sexual orientation, it would not be clear why scientists,
who have an interest in promoting their own research agendas, should make value
judgments on behalf of the whole society.
For these reasons, I do not consider an expert-driven approach viable. I do not claim
that experts should not have any say in decisions concerning moral and social values
in science. My claim is rather that they should not have a disproportionate power in
such decisions (see also Reiss 2019). As Turner (2006) argues, granting experts too
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much power undermines democratic principles in two ways. Excessive expert power
poses a threat to the equality of citizens. It also threatens the ideal of neutrality, that
is, the view that in liberal democratic societies, the state should aim to be neutral with
respect to specific conceptions of good life and treat these conceptions even-handedly
(see also Lacey 2013).
If we reject an expert-driven approach, the next step is to ask which mechanisms
can be used to pool information about citizens’ value perspectives. In the remaining
parts of the section, I consider both a market and a political mechanism.
3.2 Market-driven approach
According to a market-driven approach, the market is the best place to find out about
the value perspectives of citizens. This approach is often associated with American
Cold War doctrines concerning the proper relations between science and society. The
underlying assumption is that citizens’ choices in the market reflect their actual values
better than, for example, majority-voting procedures (Mirowski 2004, p. 307). Given
a market-driven approach, socially responsible scientists should aim to respond to
the demand in the market. Scientists may do this, for instance, by collaborating with
entrepreneurswho specialize in the formation of startups, or byworking for companies,
which have information about consumer preferences. A market-driven approach is
consistent with numerous efforts to commercialize scientific knowledge, for instance,
via patenting, consultancy, and academic entrepreneurship.
The major flaw in a market-driven approach is in the assumption that the market
is the best place to find information about the value perspectives of citizens. This
assumption is false. The demand in the market reflects the values and the preferences
of the wealthy segments of the society better than the values and the preferences of the
poor because the poor has limited resources to express their values and preferences
by means of consumer choices. For this reason, a market-driven approach needs to
be supplemented with a political approach of some sort to acquire information about
the value perspectives of all citizens in the society, including members of marginal or
subordinate social groups. What exactly should the political approach be like? Next,
I discuss one sort of political approach, a government-driven approach.
3.3 Government-driven approach
According to a government-driven approach, elected politicians and policymakers they
have nominated are in the best position to express the value perspectives of citizens (at
least in liberal democratic societies). Historically, this approach has been attractive,
for example, to those science policy actors (e.g., James B. Conant), who wished to
ensure that scientists contribute to national defense and security not just in times of war
but also of peace (Biddle 2011). Given a government-driven approach, governments,
or special committees nominated by governments, should set agendas for scientific
research. They can do this by channeling funds directly to research and development
projects (e.g., theManhattan Project), or by introducing funding instruments that target
specific themes and topics, which are in line with government policy.
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I argue that even though a government-driven approach avoids the problem of
excessive expert power and excessive commercial interests in science, it has its own
shortcomings. Elected politicians and policymakers they have nominated have often
merely a partial picture of the needs of the society, and they are not immune to pres-
sures from powerful interest groups. Moreover, there is a conflict between the rhythm
of politics and that of scientific research. Whereas government policies tend to change
in every election period, scientific research demands stability over a longer period to
deliver results. There is a danger that a government-driven approach prevents scien-
tists from addressing complex social, environmental, and technological problems by
pushing scientists towards superficial and fast research projects. In the worst scenario,
an authoritarian government supersedes a liberal democratic order and abolishes the
autonomy of scientific institutions.
In sum, none of the three approaches—an expert-driven, a market-driven, or a
government-driven—provides a satisfactory answer to the Proper Values Question.
Yet, it would be premature to give up the attempt to reconcile scientists’ moral and
social value judgments with democratic principles. In the next section, I discuss
two models for socially responsible science, well-ordered science and deliberative
polling. The two models aim to improve on an expert-driven, a market-driven, and
a government-driven approach by inviting input from a variety of stakeholders, from
experts and policymakers to citizens whose lives scientific research influences, either
directly or indirectly.
4 Procedural accounts of social responsibility
The two models for socially responsible science aim to solve a dilemma between
public participation and informed decision-making. On the one hand, the ideal of
public participation tells that scientists should consult as many citizens as practically
possible to ensure that democratically endorsedmoral and social values guide scientific
research. On the other hand, the ideal of informed decision-making tells that citizens
should have adequate information about the current state of science, the potential risks
and benefits of various lines of inquiry, and the cost of scientific research to be able
to make informed decisions. There is a tension between these two ideals. Large-scale
participation tends to undermine informed decision-making and vice versa.
One solution to the dilemma is a mini-public that is representative of the larger pub-
lic and capable of deliberation and informed decision-making. Ideally, a deliberation
in a mini-public provides scientists with information about the public’s counterfactual
informed democratic decisions concerning appropriate moral and social values in sci-
ence. In other words, a deliberating mini-public tells scientists what decisions citizens
would make if they had an opportunity to participate in a deliberation and if they had
sufficient information about relevant alternatives and their benefits, costs, and risks.
It is important to notice that a deliberation in a mini-public does not have the polit-
ical authority or the legitimizing force that actual democratic decisions have (Keren
2015). While political authority lies in well-functioning liberal democratic institu-
tions, the goal of the mini-public is to provide scientists with information about the
many needs, interests, and value perspectives of citizens. In this section, I argue that
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purely procedural accounts of socially responsible science do not succeed in meeting
this goal.
4.1 Well-ordered science
According to Kitcher, the need for well-ordered science grows out of the insight that
scientific inquiry aims for significant truth, and not just plain truth (2011, p. 111). As
significance ismorally and socially value-laden concept, the challenge is to understand
how scientists’ judgments of significance are integrated with democratic principles
(2011, p. 106). AsKitcher argues, scientific knowledge is rarely an “all-purpose instru-
ment” for society, and hence, science needs democratic guidance (2011, p. 108).
Kitcher proposes the view that “science is well ordered when its specification of
the problems to be pursued would be endorsed by an ideal conversation, embodying
all human points of view, under conditions of mutual engagement” (2011, p. 106; see
also 2001, pp. 122–123). He argues that well-ordered science is a better option than
science subjected to actual democratic decisions because the great majority of citizens
do not have sufficient understanding of science to be able to make informed decisions
(2011, p. 113; see also 2001, p. 117). A majority vote is likely to lead to “the tyranny
of ignorance” (2011, p. 118).
In well-ordered science, scientists’ moral and social value judgments conform to
the democratic decisions of ideal deliberators who are representatives of different
social groups (Kitcher 2001, p. 123). Ideal deliberators are “tutored” by “disinterest-
ed” experts (2001, p. 120; see also 2011, p. 114), and in case of expert disagreement,
they have a chance to hear both sides of the controversy (2011, p. 115). Besides being
familiar with the current state of scientific research and “the atlas of scientific signifi-
cance” (2011, p. 127), deliberators are sensitive to one another’s needs (2011, p. 129;
see also 2001, p. 119). Kitcher even suggests that, “The atlas of scientific significance
could be supplemented with an index of human needs” (2011, p. 129). Moreover,
the group of deliberators could include representatives for those who cannot repre-
sent themselves, such as future generations, animals, children, and severely disabled
people (2001, p. 126; see also 2011, p. 116).
According to Kitcher, a deliberation can end in two ways. The deliberators may
reach an agreement on an ordered list of research agendas, or in case they do not
reach an agreement, they may take a vote on some alternatives (2001, p. 119). In well-
ordered science, the deliberators do not have the authority to make decisions about
research funding; instead, their role is to inform funding agencies, universities, and
research institutions about themoral and social values that should guide such decisions
(2001, p. 122). Funding agencies, universities, and research institutions can use this
information to set opportunities and incentives to certain research agendas. Similarly,
scientists can use the information to make sound moral and social value judgments
in their research. Thus, well-ordered science does not impose strict constraints on the
freedom of scientific inquiry (understood as freedom constrained by research ethics).
Kitcher’s well-ordered science strikes many philosophers as a highly idealized pro-
cedure of pooling information about citizens’ value perspectives. As Kitcher himself
stresses, his intention is to describe an ideal at which scientific institutions should
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aim (2001, p. 123; see also 2011, p. 125). He says that, “any actual conversation of
this type is impossible” (2011, p. 115). Yet, he suggests that scientific institutions
can move towards the ideal by identifying those aspects of present-day science that
depart in striking ways from well-ordered science. He identifies four aspects. First,
contemporary science is constrained by historical contingencies that no longer reflect
human needs (2011, pp. 125–126). Second, politicians, interest groups, and social
movements practice democratic control of science in an adversarial rather than delib-
erative way (2011, p. 126). Third, the privatization of scientific research moves some
areas of science away from democratic control of research agendas (2011, p. 126).
Fourth, current scientific research neglects the interests of a vast number of people
(2011, p. 127). As the fourth aspect indicates, Kitcher is concerned with the problem
that scientific agenda-setting does not take into account the needs of women, children,
members of minorities, and people in developing countries (2001, p. 127).
Given that Kitcher intends well-ordered science to be inclusive of the value per-
spectives of marginal or subordinate social groups, it is fair to ask how well-ordered
science should be developed or refined so that it accomplishes this task. The ideal of
well-ordered science raises many questions, such as how deliberators and experts are
chosen, and how their interactions are structured (Leuschner 2012, p. 194). According
to Kitcher, it is a matter of empirical inquiry to find out which procedures and struc-
tures best approximate well-ordered science (2011, p. 225). He suggests that James
Fishkin’s (2009) deliberative polling is one way to run an experiment on such proce-
dures and structures (2011, p. 225). In the next section, I discuss deliberative polling
as a model for socially responsible science.
4.2 Deliberative polling
While Kitcher’s well-ordered science is an ideal that scientific institutions cannot
fully realize, deliberative polling is a procedure that can be implemented in practice.
Another difference betweenwell-ordered science and deliberative polling concerns the
question of what representation means. While Kitcher does not specify in what sense
deliberators “represent” different groups in the society, deliberative polling requires
that deliberators be a random sample selected from a larger population. According to
Fishkin, random sampling is one way to realize the democratic ideal of equality even
though randomly selected deliberators are not “representatives” in the same way as
democratically elected persons are representatives of their constituents (2009, p. 39).
Like Kitcher, Fishkin (2009) is concerned with the inclusiveness of deliberating
mini-publics. He is worried about the “internal exclusion” of marginal or subordinate
social groups, which occurs when “some people may be in the room but without
having their views taken seriously” (2009, p. 160). As a remedy to the problem of
“internal exclusion,” Fishkin proposes oversampling marginal or subordinate social
groups (e.g., the Aboriginals in Australia) to ensure that minority representatives are
heard by representatives from larger social groups (2009, p. 162). While both Kitcher
and Fishkin are concerned with inclusiveness, their approaches diverge at a crucial
point. By emphasizing the ideal nature of deliberation, Kitcher wishes to include not
merely the viewpoints of marginal or subordinate social groups but also the viewpoints
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of those who cannot represent themselves (e.g., future generations, animals, children,
and severely disabled people).
Deliberative polling occurs when a random sample of people selected from relevant
social groups participate in a small group discussion with a moderator. To facilitate
deliberation and informed decision-making, experts on various topics relevant to the
policy issue at hand will brief the group members. Like in well-ordered science, a
deliberative process may culminate in an agreement or a majority vote. Ideally, the
outcome reflects the counterfactual informed democratic decision of relevant social
groups, that is, the decision they would make if they had an opportunity to deliberate
and to make an informed democratic decision.
Like Kitcher, Alexandrova (2018) proposes deliberative polling as a model for
socially responsible science. She argues that deliberative polling is appropriate when
there is a disagreement over the question of which moral and social values should
guide scientific research. To ensure that values have undergone an appropriate social
control, scientists should follow three rules. The first rule tells scientists to “unearth
the value presuppositions in methods and measures” (2018, p. 437). The second rule
advises scientists to “check if value presuppositions are invariant to disagreements”
(2018, p. 438). In case value judgments are invariant to several moral and political
outlooks, scientific research is socially responsible, and no further steps are necessary.
However, in case value judgments vary significantly across differentmoral andpolitical
outlooks, scientists should proceed to the third rule that recommends deliberative
polling. As Alexandrova explains, “When the choice of a measure of well-being is a
choice between conflicting sets of values, the only way to practice trustworthy science
is to make this choice in a deliberative public setting that includes the relevant parties”
(2018, p. 439).
The crucial question in deliberative polling is who the relevant parties are. The
answer to this question depends on the subject matter of inquiry. In the case of human
well-being, Alexandrova (2018) argues, representatives from three groups of people
should participate in deliberations. One group consists of scientists and scholars who
study human well-being, another group of the policy users of scientific research, and
yet another group of citizens who are likely to be affected when research results are
put into practice through policies, therapies, and other interventions (2018, p. 440).
Thus far, we have seen two models aiming to integrate scientists’ moral and
social value judgements with counterfactual informed democratic decisions. The two
models have advantages over expert-driven, market-driven, and government-driven
approaches. Unlike expert-driven and market-driven approaches, they avoid the prob-
lem of excessive expert power and excessive commercial interests, both of which
undermine the democratic principles of equality and neutrality. Unlike government-
driven approaches, they invite input directly from citizens whose lives scientific
research is likely influence. They also grant a reasonable degree of autonomy to scien-
tists by emphasizing that a deliberation in a mini-public is a means to inform scientists
about citizens’ value perspectives, and not a means tomake funding decisions. Despite
these advantages, I wish to draw attention to their limitations.
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4.3 Criticism
I argue that as tools of information processing, the two models for socially responsible
science are only as inclusive as the pool of alternative value perspectives they engage.
The two models do not offer any means to extend this pool. Yet, the pool of alternative
value perspectives is limited due to relations of power that prevent some social groups
from communicating their social experiences and value perspectives to others.
Let me explain how relations of power can prevent people from communicating
their social experiences and value perspectives to others. For example, relations of
power can intimidate potential testifiers. Some people are not willing to share their
social experiences and value perspectives because they are afraid of the consequences.
Besides invoking fear, relations of power can suppress testimonies by giving rise to
painful emotions such as shame. A sense of shame may prompt a potential testifier to
hide or cover up her social experiences, thereby silencing her. Relations of power can
suppress or distort testimonies also by means of “testimonial smothering” (Dotson
2011). As Kristie Dotson defines it, testimonial smothering means, “the truncating of
one’s own testimony in order to insure that the testimony contains only content for
which one’s audience demonstrates testimonial competence” (2011, p. 244). More-
over, relations of power can suppress or distort testimonies by inflicting “hermeneutical
injustice” on potential testifiers (Fricker 2007). Hermeneutical injustice is the injus-
tice of having one’s social experience obscured from collective understanding owing
to a lacuna in collective hermeneutical resources (Fricker 2007, p. 158). Insofar as
social experiences and value perspectives remain private, they cannot enter into public
deliberation. Thus, relations of power can limit not only who participates in a mini-
public but also the pool of alternative value perspectives that deliberators bring into the
mini-public, thereby undermining the democratic values of equality and inclusiveness.
More could be said about the ways in which relations of power hamper commu-
nication. My brief review is meant to show that relations of power are potentially a
problem for well-ordered science and deliberative polling. Inclusion of marginal or
subordinate social groups does not automatically lead to inclusion of their social expe-
riences and value perspectives. The former inclusion is merely a step towards the latter
inclusion. This is why random sampling—or oversampling marginal or subordinate
social groups—is not enough to guarantee the diversity of social experiences. Nor is
it sufficient to appeal to the index of human needs, as Kitcher does (2011, p. 129).
Even if there were such an index, relations of power could prevent deliberators from
seeing that the needs of some social groups are not satisfied. The index would have
to be supplemented with a process that helps scientists understand why the needs of
some social groups are not satisfied and how they could be met.
As James Bohman (2006) argues, the success of deliberation depends on the diver-
sity of social experiences participants bring into the deliberation. This is because social
experiences embody important information about the society. Social experiences are
social in two senses: they arise in particular social locations and they are shared with
other people inhabiting similar social locations. Social experiences may involve also
local knowledge, that is, knowledge about particular cultural, economic or social prac-
tices and their circumstances. Given this understanding of social experience, important
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information about society is distributed across different social locations. The more
complex societies are in terms of the division of labor and the more unequal they
are in terms of economic resources and opportunities, education and health, the more
radically different the social experiences of the citizens are likely to be. Moreover, the
more multicultural societies are in terms of ethnic identities and languages, the more
likely it is that the social experiences of the citizens diverge.
To summarize, as tools of information pooling, well-ordered science and delibera-
tive polling are limited by the pool of value perspectives that have already been made
public. This is because they are purely procedural accounts of social responsibility.
They define a procedure that would ideally tell scientists which moral and social val-
ues citizens would prefer if they made informed decisions. In order to understand how
the existing pool of value perspectives could be inclusive of the value perspectives of
subordinate and marginal social groups, we need to supplement procedural accounts
of socially responsible science with other strategies.
In the next section, I propose one strategy to broaden the pool of value perspectives.
The strategy advises us to take seriously the view that relations of power can prevent
people from communicating their social experiences and value perspectives to others.
The task is to understand how we can challenge relations of power and the barriers
they raise for communication.
5 Scientific/intellectual movements
I argue that scientific/intellectual movements (SIMs) can play an important role in
increasing the social responsibility of scientific research. As Scott Frickel and Neil
Gross define them, “SIMs are collective efforts to pursue research programs or projects
for thought in the face of resistance from others in the scientific or intellectual com-
munity” (2005, p. 206). Social sciences are especially apt for the creation of SIMs
because they include “advocacy scholarship,” that is, research that aims to articulate
the standpoint of a social group in a way that is intelligible and instructive to the
members of the group (Turner 2009, p. 175). Advocacy scholarship involves often
collaboration between social scientists and members of the social group. A SIM is
an apt ally for advocacy scholarship since it facilitates a collaboration whereby social
scientists invite some members of the social group to contribute to the research design
or to participate in the research process in some other way. While advocacy scholar-
ship is hardly disinterested, its legitimacy lies in the view that it serves the purpose of
improving democratic discussions (2009, p. 176). As Turner explains, “The political
meaning of sociology is thus to contribute to the diversity of political discussion by
helping to give voice and support to particular movements and groups” (2009, p. 177).
Feminist social science is an example of a SIM that aims to make visible the social
experiences and value perspectives of marginal or subordinate social groups. It has
been successful in pursuing a program for scientific change (e.g., correcting gender
biases and creating new research topics out of women’s experiences) and challeng-
ing normative views about scientific research (e.g., the ideal of value-free science)
(Crasnow 2007).
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I argue that—unlike experts, markets, governments, and deliberative mini-
publics—SIMs have the capacity to extend the pool of alternative value perspectives.
Those social scientists who create or take part in SIMs are often moved by dissatis-
faction with the value relevance of research, or lack of it. They create a SIM in order
to develop a general value orientation (e.g., gender equality) into a concrete research
project (e.g., a research project on violence against women and domestic violence).
Without such work, it is difficult to understand what a general value orientation, such
as gender equality, means in terms of research problems, theoretical concepts, meth-
ods, and data collection. Most importantly, it is difficult to know what it takes to
pursue a moral and social goal, such as equality, unless one understands how actual
inequalities are generated and maintained. By converting a general value orientation
into a research project or program, a SIM can communicate otherwise invisible social
experiences and value perspectives to the larger scientific community and the society
as a whole.
Moreover, a SIM can do this despite—or against—relations of power, which tend to
suppress or distort testimonies. Due to its collective nature, a SIM can do at least four
things that individual social scientists cannot do on their own. First, a SIMcan empower
potential testifiers by shifting the balance of power relations (Rolin 2016b, p. 17).
Empowerment is the ability of an individual or a group to act in spite of or in response to
the power wielded over the individual or the group by others. For example, when social
scientists encounter the difficulty of gathering interview data against the forces of fear
and shame, they canmove from the task of articulating individual social experiences to
the task of articulating shared social experiences. For many informants, the realization
that their social experiences are widely shared may be a step towards empowerment.
Second, a SIM can empower testifiers by transforming their self-perception (Rolin
2016b, p. 17). It can provide both researchers and the participants of research with
novel opportunities for interaction and self-perception, and these changes may lead to
novel ways of speaking. Third, a SIM can empower testifiers by providing them with
a sense of moral and political justification for speaking in novel ways (2016b, p. 17).
A SIM can restore hermeneutical justice by conceptualizing and theorizing social
problems that have lacked a widely recognized name (Koskinen and Rolin 2019).
Fourth, a SIM can provide inquirers with a novel epistemic community (Rolin 2016b,
pp. 17–18). In such a community, social scientists can receive fruitful criticism for
research, which the larger scientific community has ignored. A potential obstacle to
any scientific research is that its development is hindered by a lack of constructive
criticism. It is met either with a silence or with an unnecessarily harsh criticism,
which is unlikely to be helpful for researchers. Under such circumstances, a SIM can
be epistemically empowering by providing researchers with an epistemic community
where they can receive valuable criticism and uptake for their ideas.
In sum, due to its collective nature, a SIM can make social experiences and value
perspectives visible under conditions where relations of power tend to suppress or
distort testimonies. It is not my intention to suggest that all social scientists should take
part in a SIM aiming to do justice to the social experiences of marginal or subordinate
social groups. My proposal is rather that at least some social scientists should do so
because it would increase the social responsibility of research. I do not suggest either
that a SIM will ensure that all social experiences and value perspective have a hearing
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in scientific communities. Some social experiences and value perspectives may go
unnoticed even for a SIM that is committed to valorizing marginal or subordinate
viewpoints.
In this section, I have criticized purely procedural accounts of socially responsi-
ble science by arguing that no single procedure can guarantee that mini-publics are
inclusive of the social experiences and value perspectives of subordinate or marginal
social groups. Building a SIM is a strategy to bring marginal or subordinate social
experiences and value perspectives into the sphere of public deliberation. The term
“strategy” is meant to suggest here that it is not a straightforward procedure that sci-
entific communities can implement. As SIMs are collective intellectual movements
aiming for scientific change, creating a SIM is akin to building a social movement in
the larger society.
6 Conclusions
I started my inquiry into scientific objectivity by examining the idea that objectivity
gives us a permission to trust scientific knowledge claims, and I arrived at the con-
clusion that SIMs can play an important role in increasing trust in social research by
promoting socially responsible science. Let me rehearse my steps.
I have argued that when we find ourselves in a relation of epistemic dependence,
trust in scientific knowledge claims involves reliance on the knowledge claims and trust
in scientists who present the claims. According to a widespread view, trustworthiness
requires expertise, honesty, and social responsibility. Given this view, objectivity turns
out to be a hybrid concept with both an epistemic and a moral-political dimension.
The epistemic dimension tells us when scientific knowledge claims are reliable and the
moral-political dimension when we can trust scientists to be socially responsible, that
is, to follow “sound” moral and social values in different stages of scientific inquiry
(Kourany 2010, p. 106). While few philosophers would deny that social responsibility
is an important component of trustworthiness, their views diverge on the question of
how scientists can receive information about appropriate moral and social values. I
have called this the Proper Values Question.
In response to the Proper Values Question, I have argued that procedural accounts
of social responsibility, such as well-ordered science and deliberative polling, have
advantages over expert, market, and government-driven approaches. Yet, these two
accounts of social responsibility are limited because they can process information
merely from a pool of value perspectives that have already found their way to the
public sphere. To overcome this limitation, we need to consider strategies that could
extend the existing pool of value perspectives.
I have proposed one such strategy. The strategy involves SIMs that are in a position
to challenge relations of power. I have argued that SIMs have the capacity to extend the
pool of value perspectives by giving voice tomarginal or subordinate social groups. By
making the pool of value perspectives more inclusive, SIMs provide scientific commu-
nities with better information about citizens’ moral and social value perspectives and
respective research projects. To observe such perspectives in scientific research is to be
socially responsible, and to be socially responsible is one aspect in the more complex
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notion of being a trustworthy source of information. Insofar as scientific objectivity
is about authorizing trust in scientific knowledge claims, social responsibility is one
dimension of objectivity.
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